STATE OF VERMONT
ENVIRONMENTAL COURT
}
Appeal
of Lovell
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Docket No. 194-10-04 Vtec
}
}
Decision and Order on Appellant=s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Appellant-Applicant
Raymond Lovell appealed from a decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA)
of the Town of Maidstone denying a permit to subdivide a ninety-acre parcel on
the easterly side of Vermont Route 102
into three parcels of forty-four acres, forty acres, and six acres. Appellant is represented by Deborah T.
Bucknam, Esq.; the Town of Maidstone is represented by Robert A. Gensburg,
Esq.
Appellant
has moved for partial summary judgment.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. All section references are to the
Zoning Bylaw and Subdivision Regulations (the Bylaw), unless otherwise noted.
Appellant
owns a ninety-acre parcel of land in the Agricultural zoning district westerly
of the Connecticut River and easterly of Vermont Route 102. The Agricultural zoning district is
defined as Athe
land along the Connecticut River as indicated on the official zoning
map;@
however, neither party has provided a copy of the official zoning map showing
the district. Based on Exhibit 2 to
Appellant=s
affidavit, it appears that most of the land between Route 102 and the river is
actually zoned Rural Lands-1 (RL-1), and that only Appellant=s
property and two small parcels of land owned by James Fay and Robert Value,
respectively, are zoned Agricultural, although most of the RL-1 land easterly of
the road is in fact in agricultural use.
Appellant=s
easterly property line curves along the river. A loop of the river extends into
Appellant=s
property and has created an island.
Appellant
proposes to divide the property into three parcels. The proposed forty-acre parcel is the
most southerly and consists of the land south of the island; the proposed
six-acre parcel is in the middle and includes the island, and the proposed
forty-four-acre parcel consists of the land northerly of the
island.
All
that Appellant is proposing is to subdivide his property; he does not at this
time propose any particular use of the subdivided lots. He submitted an application to the
Zoning Administrative Officer on the form for a zoning permit ('702.03),
rather than submitting an application requesting minor subdivision approval
('502.01). No party has suggested that there is any separate form for
submitting a subdivision
application, nor does the zoning permit application form provide a box to check
off for subdivision approval of a minor subdivision by the Zoning Administrative
Officer. Appellant=s
application form stated that the proposed use is both residential and
agricultural, but did not propose any new construction, which suggests that an
existing house may be located on the property. However, material facts have not been
provided to the Court regarding whether any existing structures exist on the
property.
The
Town of Maidstone may have initially intended to use its Agricultural zoning
district in the way that some other towns use a flood hazard overlay district,
to restrict development in areas prone to flooding. Indeed, an earlier proposal in late 1998
for the proposed zoning map, provided as an attachment to Appellant=s
affidavit, shows most of Appellant=s
and others=
land in the floodplain of the river as a proposed Aflood
zone@
except for a small amount of land close to Route 102 , which was proposed to be
zoned Rural Lands 1. However, if
the Agricultural district is accurately reflected in the attachment to
Appellant=s
affidavit, it appears that it does not apply generally to the Connecticut River
Valley floodplain.
In
the Agricultural zoning district, only three permitted uses are allowed, and
there is no provision for any conditional uses. The allowed permitted uses are only
Aagricultural
use@
and Aprimary
forestry operation,@
with Ahome
occupations@
being allowed as permitted uses only in existing dwelling units.[1] '203,
Table 203.07. Because no new
buildings (other than exempt agricultural structures) are allowed, unlike in
other zoning districts, the Agricultural zoning district had no minimum
dimensional requirements for lot size, road frontage, or building setbacks. '203,
Table 203.07. However, nothing in
'203
or in the sections governing subdivisions, ''501-506,
prohibits the subdivision of land in the Agricultural zoning district, as long
as it is kept in the allowed agricultural or forestry
uses.
Appellant
submitted the application to the Town Clerk on June 3, 2004, rather than to the
Zoning Administrative Officer; the Zoning Administrative Officer did not receive
the application until June 8, 2004.
After informing Appellant that the Bylaw did not contain a provision for
subdividing land in the Agricultural zoning district and after contacting
Appellant three times by telephone regarding whether he intended to withdraw his
application and receive a refund of the filing fee, the Zoning Administrative
Officer acted to deny the application on July 7, 2004. Appellant filed a timely appeal of that
decision to the ZBA on July 22, 2004.
The
ZBA considered the matter at a September 13, 2004 meeting; however, the parties
have not provided the warning for or the minutes of that ZBA hearing. While Appellant=s
statement of undisputed facts simply states that no explanation was contained in
the minutes, it would have been helpful to know how that hearing was warned and
how the vote was proposed, as the denial letter dated September 21, 2004, refers
to Appellant=s
having requested a variance from the ZBA.
The denial letter states the ZBA=s
findings that the variance criteria were met, but appears to have denied the
request for the subdivision permit on the same basis as the Zoning
Administrative Officer: that no provisions in the Bylaw allows subdivision of
agricultural land. The present
appeal is from that action of the ZBA.
In
March of 2005, the Zoning Bylaw was amended to provide for a minimum lot size of
fifteen acres and a minimum road frontage of 800 feet in the Agricultural Zoning
district. Appellant had no obligation to reapply under the changed regulations,
and declined to adjust his proposed subdivision to bring the middle parcel up to
a fifteen-acre size that would have qualified for approval under the amended
regulations.
Appellant
first argues that his application for approval of a minor subdivision should be
deemed to have been approved because he submitted the application to the Town
Clerk on June 3, 2004 and the Administrative Officer did not act to deny the
application until July 7, 2004,
exceeding the thirty-day period for an Administrative Officer=s
decision on an application for a zoning permit contained in '702.04, and see 24 V.S.A. '4464(a)
(in effect[2]
until July 1, 2004).
First,
as the application under consideration by the Zoning Administrative Officer was
for minor subdivision approval and
was not a zoning permit application, it is not clear to the Court that the
thirty-day period for Administrative Officer action on a zoning permit in
'702.04
even applies to this application.
Nor does '702.04
contain a deemed approval provision for exceeding the thirty-day period.
Even assuming that 24 V.S.A. '4464(a)
(in effect until July 1, 2004) provided a deemed approval remedy for an
administrative officer=s
failure to act on an application for minor subdivision approval that is not also
an application for a zoning permit, the Zoning Administrative
Officer=s
action was timely if measured from the date on which he received the
application. He was cognizant of
the time deadline, as shown by his calls to Appellant stating that he would have
to issue his ruling. Moreover, even
if the time were calculated from the June 3, 2004 date on which the application
was submitted to the Town Clerk, due to the July 4 holiday weekend, the 30-day
period would not have expired until July 6, 2004. A one-day delay, under the
circumstances, would not represent the type of Adeliberate
or negligent@
administrative inaction or delay that might warrant the deemed approval
remedy. In re Appeal of McEwing
Services, 2004 VT 53, &
21.
Appellant
next argues that his application for a minor subdivision should have been
approved on its merits. There is no
question that the proposal falls within the definition of a minor subdivision in
'602
(division of a parcel into Anot
more than three improvable lots@);
Aimprovable
lot@
in turn is defined as a lot conforming with the minimum area and dimensional
requirements for the district (and any pre-existing nonconforming lot). Similarly, under the minor subdivision
requirements of '502.01,
a minor subdivision must meet the minimum area and dimensional requirements of
the Bylaw. '502.01(A).
Because
the Bylaw in effect when Appellant filed his application imposed no minimum area
or dimensional requirements in the Agricultural zoning district,
Appellant=s
three-lot subdivision application met the requirements of the Bylaw. The fact that the Bylaw prohibits the
construction of permanent non-agricultural structures in the Agricultural zoning
district, including the construction of new houses, does not prevent Appellant
from subdividing his property as proposed.
The
fact that the Bylaw was later amended to require a minimum lot size in the
Agricultural zoning district may mean that the resulting six-acre lot would have
become a pre-existing non-conforming lot with respect to the new lot size
requirements, but that fact does not prohibit Appellant from making that
division based on an application filed in good faith before the change was
proposed.
Finally,
Appellant argues that the Town engaged in >illegal
reverse spot zoning=[3]
when it originally adopted the ordinance creating the Agricultural zoning
district. However, in the present appeal Appellant does not seek to invalidate
the Agricultural zoning district per se, but rather to argue that
the proposed subdivision should have been approved. As an alternative to the spot zoning
analysis, Appellant argues for application of the analysis in In re
Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 549 (1998) in support of his claim that his
property has been singled out illegally.
However, the selective enforcement analysis discussed in
Letourneau is only applicable in the context of an appeal of a notice of
violation or an enforcement action.
In
any event, because we have ruled that the subdivision approval should have been
granted, in the present appeal it is not necessary to reach the constitutional
issue inherent in a claim of spot zoning or any other formulation of a denial of
equal treatment under the law.
However, we note that the issue may arise again should Appellant seek to
construct residences on any of the resulting parcels, or to expand any existing
residence, as the Agricultural zoning district requirements preclude such
action. In connection with both
parties=
analysis of whether the Agricultural zoning district may be vulnerable to such a
claim, we note that under 24 V.S.A. '4472(b),
as amended in 2004, such a constitutional claim may be raised independently in
superior court, in advance of any zoning application; but that it may only be
addressed in this court in the context of an appropriate case, such as an appeal
from a permit denial.
Accordingly,
based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that
Appellant=s
motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED in part, in that
Appellant=s
application for subdivision approval should have been and is hereby GRANTED; it
is otherwise DENIED on the issues of deemed approval, spot zoning, and selective
enforcement.
This
decision appears to conclude the issues in the appeal. If the parties believe that any issues
remain, please advise the Court in writing and a telephone conference will be
scheduled to discuss what issues, if any, remain to be scheduled for
trial.
Done
at Berlin, Vermont, this 6th day of September,
2005.
_________________________________________________
Merideth
Wright
Environmental
Judge
[1] Oddly, it does not provide for
residential uses as allowed uses in existing dwelling units, so that all
existing dwelling units became existing non-conforming uses in the Agricultural
zoning district upon the adoption of those regulations in July of 2002 (or at
whatever earlier date those particular provisions were
adopted).
[2] A similar provision was carried forward
into the revised statute, at 24 V.S.A. '4448(d);
however, the former statute was applicable as of June 3, 2004, the triggering
date for the running of the thirty-day period.
[3] Spot zoning Asingles
out a small parcel or perhaps even a single lot for a use classification
different from the surrounding area and inconsistent with any comprehensive
plan, for the benefit of the owner of such property,@
Granger v. Woodford, 167 Vt. 610, 610B11
(1998) (citing Galanes v. Town of Brattleboro, 136 Vt. 235, 239 (1978)),
or, as argued here, to the detriment of the owner. The courts examine the use of the parcel
in comparison with the prevailing use of other parcels in the area; the size of
the parcel relative to the size of the challenged district; whether the
classification is for the benefit of the community or only to provide a specific
advantage or disadvantage to a particular landowner; and whether the challenged
zoning classification complies with the municipality's
plan.